Introduction
In the classical cooperative game theory, it is generally assumed that players are totally selfish when distributing the worth generated by cooperating activities. Undoubtedly, the most prominent example of players' pure selfishness is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 [13] ). Assuming that the grand coalition has formed by a succession of one-by-one arrivals, the Shapley value is obtained when each entering player obtains his entire expected 1 marginal contribution to the coalition of players he joins upon arriving.
1 Yet in many reallife situations, individuals may show solidarity with the others to ensure that each gets his "slice of the pie".
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In this article, we provide a new allocation rule, called the weighted Equal Allocation of Non-Separable Contributions (ENSC) value and inspired by the ENSC value 3 (Moulin, 1985 [9] ), which takes into account players' selfishness when distributing the worth of the grand coalition. Interestingly, the weighted ENSC value respectively coincides with the ENSC value when players are totally selfish and the equal division solution when players are purely altruistic.
First, we implement the weighted ENSC value by designing a new allocation scenario based on a one-by-one formation of the grand coalition in which each entering player takes away a part of his marginal contribution to the grand coalition depending on his selfishness level, while the residual brought by his joining is evenly distributed among the players already there. Our construction procedure is justified by the necessity to appeal to a regulator to ensure some solidarity among the players as is the case, for example, with health insurances (Stone, 1993 [14] ).
Once the players have received their payoffs in a transferable utility game (henceforth a TU-game), they may be dissatisfied and express an amount of complaint within a coalition. 4 The complaint of a coalition manifests its members' potential to create more utility if they decide to contest an allocation. When the sum of players' marginal contributions to the grand coalition cannot be covered by the worth of the grand coalition, we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion, called the selfish complaint, which only depends on players' selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides basic definitions and notations. Section 3 deals with the procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value. In Section 4, we study the weighted ENSC value by using an optimization approach based on players' complaint. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
TU-games and solution concepts
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set of n players. An element i ∈ N and a nonempty subset S ⊆ N are respectively called a player and a coalition. For each coalition S ⊆ N , its cardinality will be denoted by |S|. A TU-game on the set N of players is a real-valued function v defined on the set 2 N of all subsets of N such that v(∅) = 0. For 4 Davis and Maschler (1965 [3] ) introduced the complaint of a coalition based on the excess criterion to determine the kernel of TU-games. each coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) describes the worth that coalition S can achieve when all its members cooperate. The set of all TU-games is denoted by G.
An order on N is a bijection π : N −→ N where π(l) = i indicates that player i has the l th position. The set of all the n! orders is denoted by Π (N ) . A solution on G is a function ϕ which associates with each TU-game (N, v) ∈ G a subset ϕ(N, v) ⊆ R N of payoff vectors. If ϕ assigns a unique payoff vector to each TU-game (N, v) ∈ G, then ϕ is called a value.
For a TU-game (N, v) ∈ G, the pre-imputation set I * (N, v) (Driessen, 1988 [5] ) is defined as the set of payoff vectors that fully distribute the worth of the grand coalition among the players, i.e.:
The ENSC value, introduced by Moulin (1985 [9] ), gives to each player i ∈ N an equal share of the surplus generated by the grand coalition besides his marginal contribution to the grand coalition, i.e.:
where
The weighted ENSC value we propose generalizes the ENSC value and allocates to each player i ∈ N an equal share of the residual surplus generated by the grand coalition besides a part α i ∈ [0, 1] of his marginal contribution to the grand coalition b v i , i.e.:
EN SC
The parameter α i is interpreted as the level of player i's selfishness and represents the part of his marginal contribution to the grand coalition he would like to obtain. Particularly, if α i = 0 for all i ∈ N , then the weighted ENSC value reduces to the equal division solution; and if α i = 1 for all i ∈ N , the weighted ENSC value coincides with the ENSC value. Moreover, if α i = α j for all i, j ∈ N , then the weighted ENSC value degenerates into the α-ENSC value proposed by Sun et al. (2017 [15] ).
Procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value
Generally, it is assumed that the grand coalition has to form in cooperative situations.
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The allocation scenario envisaged to compute the weighted ENSC value takes up this idea and consists of the following steps.
(i) Choose any TU-game (N, v) ∈ G and any order π ∈ Π(N ) to gradually form the grand coalition N .
(ii) Each entering player i ∈ N such that π −1 (i) = 1 receives his individual worth v({i}).
} is evenly distributed among the coalition members except player i.
(vi) The allocation scenario outcome, denoted by ψ(N, v), is defined as the average over all the n! orders of all the payoff vectors given by (3.1), i.e.:
In
Step (iii), player i is not the first entrant in the game. His payoff is composed of two parts: one is a fraction α i of his contribution b v i , while the other is the extra residual obtained from the set of his successors {π(π −1 (i) + 1), . . . , π(n)}. In
Step (ii), player i is initially alone in the game so that the first part of his payoff corresponds to his individual worth v({i}). Particularly, if α i = 0 for all i ∈ N , then players are purely altruistic and never occupy any gains when joining the game. For the other extreme case where α i = 1 for all i ∈ N , all the players are totally selfish and never share their marginal contributions to the grand coalition with the others. 
). Summating the payoffs obtained at the three steps, we achieve (γ
. Observe that each player's total payoff not only relies on the order π, but also depends on the selfish level α i for all i ∈ N .
Our first main result brings to light the relationship between the allocation scenario outcome and the weighted ENSC value.
Theorem 3.1. For every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G, the allocation scenario outcome given by (3.2) coincides with the weighted ENSC value, i.e.:
Proof. For notational convenience, we denote
by β t , and
. It follows from (3.1) that:
which completes the proof. 2
Optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value
The optimization implementation of solution concepts has received considerable attention over the past few years. By way of examples, we can cite Schmeidler's nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 [12] ) and Ruiz's least square pre-nucleolus (Ruiz et al., 1996 [11] ). Following in the footsteps of these works, we introduce an alternative measure of players' dissatisfaction and prove that the weighted ENSC value lexicographically minimizes the associated complaint vector. For notational convenience, we will write i∈S x i as x(S). Given a TU-game (N, v) ∈ G, a payoff vector x ∈ R N , and players' selfishness levels α i ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N , the selfish complaint of coalition S at x, denoted byê(S, x), is defined as:
Thereby, the coalition members hope to obtain at least a part of their marginal contributions to the grand coalition depending on their selfisness levels and express a positive amount of complaint if their payoffs are below these expectations. For every payoff vector x ∈ R N , let θ(x) be the 2 n -tuple whose components are the selfish complaints of coalitions S at x arranged in non-increasing order, i.e.:
Given x, y ∈ R 2 n , we say that x is lexicographically smaller than or equal to y, denoted by x ≤ L y, if x = y or if there exists t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 n } such that x k = y k for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t − 1} and x t < y t . The optimal compromise value corresponds to the unique pre-imputation x OC ∈ I * (N, v) and whose complaint vector θ(x OC ) given by (4.1) possesses the smallest lexicographic order ≤ L , i.e.:
The following result explores the relationship between the optimal compromise value and players' selfishness. 
for all i ∈ {l, m}; x
Then, it holds that:
and
where the second equality holds because
(ii) The proof is similar to that of (i).
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The next lemma brings to light the changes of coalitions' selfish complaints at different payoff vectors.
. Then, for the new payoff vector x * ∈ I * (N, v) defined as:
the following five statements hold:
(i) For any S ⊆ N such that S l, m, we haveê(S, x * ) =ê(S, x);
(ii) For any S ⊆ N such that S l, m, we haveê(S, x * ) =ê(S, x);
(iii) For any S ⊆ N such that S l and S m, we haveê(S, x * ) <ê(S, x);
(iv) For any S ⊆ N such that S l and S m, it is redundant to considerê(S, x) and e(S, x * ) when comparing θ(x) and θ(x * );
Proof. (i) It is trivial that for any S ⊆ N such that S l, m,ê(S, x) =ê(S, x * ) holds. (ii) For any S ⊆ N such that S l, m, it holds that:
(iii) For any S ⊆ N such that S l and S m, it holds that:
where the last inequality holds because ε > 0.
(iv) For any S ⊆ N such that S l and S m, it holds that:
Therefore, for any S ⊆ N such that S l and S m, there always exists a coalition S ∪ {l}\{m} such thatê(S ∪ {l}\{m}, x) >ê(S, x). Moreover, observe that
=ê(S ∪ {l}\{m}, x * ).
It follows from (iii) thatê(S ∪ {l}\{m}, x * ) <ê(S ∪ {l}\{m}, x). Thus, it is redundant to considerê(S, x) andê(S, x * ) when comparing θ(x) and θ(x * ). (v) The proof of this statement directly follows from (i),(ii),(iii) and (iv).
Our second main result provides an optimization characterization of the weighted ENSC value. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have implemented the weighted ENSC value throughout two approaches: the first one describes a procedural implementation based on a new allocation scenario and the second one provides an optimization implementation by means of players' selfish complaints. The study of other interesting values using similar techniques is left for future research.
